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Reversal of Fortune:
Litigating Health Care Reform in
Auton v. British Columbia
Christopher P. Manfredi* and Antonia Maioni*

I. INTRODUCTION
In June 2004 the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Chaoulli v.
Quebec (Attorney General)1 and Auton (Guardian ad litem of) v. British
Columbia (Attorney General).2 At issue in Chaoulli was the constitutionality of legal restrictions on the private provision of health care; at
issue in Auton was the constitutionality of British Columbia’s decision
not to fund a specific treatment for autism within its public health care
system. Chaoulli and Auton are the most visible manifestations of an
increasingly common phenomenon: the use of rights-based litigation as
an instrument of health care policy reform.3 Among the key issues that
have already been litigated under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms
are physician supply management, medical practice regulation, hospital
restructuring, and the regulation and provision of specific treatment and
services. Prior to 2004, the Supreme Court’s contribution to this phe-
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1
[2005] S.C.J. No. 33.
2
[2004] S.C.J. No. 71, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 657.
3
Martha Jackman, “The Regulation of Private Health Care Under the Canada Health Act
and the Canadian Charter” (1995) 6 Const. Forum Const. 54; Martha Jackman, “The Right to
Participate in Health Care and Health Resource Allocation Decisions Under Section 7 of the
Canadian Charter” (1995/96) 4 Health L. Rev. 3; A. Braen, Health and the Distribution of Powers
in Canada, Discussion Paper No. 2, Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada (2002);
Martha Jackman, The Implications of Section 7 of the Charter for Health Care Spending in Canada, Discussion Paper No. 31, Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada (2002); Donna
Greschner, How Will the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and Evolving Jurisprudence Affect
Health Care Costs, Discussion Paper No. 20, Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada
(2002); Christopher Manfredi & Antonia Maioni, “Courts and Health Policy: Judicial Policy
Making and Publicly Funded Health Care in Canada” (2002) 27 J. Health Pol. 211.
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nomenon included nullifying the federal abortion law, modifying
professional advertising regulations, upholding the criminal prohibition
against assisted suicide, and establishing a constitutional right to sign
language interpretation in the provision of health care services.4
With the exception of Morgentaler, which established an entirely
new abortion regime that depends crucially on the widespread use of
private clinics,5 the Supreme Court’s health care decisions have operated
largely at the periphery of this policy field. Chaoulli and Auton are different. The first potentially challenges the very existence of publicly
funded health care, and the second challenges the plenary authority of
provincial governments to determine the scope of their public health
care systems. The cases thus speak to core questions about the organization and implementation of health care policy, as well as to the judicial
process’s institutional decision making capacity.
The cases also speak to broader questions about a cluster of related
phenomena that falls under the rubric of “legal mobilization.” These
phenomena include the “process by which legal norms are invoked to
regulate behavior;”6 the translation of desires into demands through “an
assertion of one’s rights;”7 and a “planned effort to influence the course
of judicial policy development to achieve a particular policy goal.”8 As a
strategy for policy reform, legal mobilization ideally aims at establishing new legal rules that generate desirable policy consequences and
strengthen the political position of the reform’s advocates. Reality,
however, is usually more complicated. Legal mobilization may fail to
establish sought-for legal rule changes, yet desirable policy consequences may follow; desirable rules may emerge from litigation, but have no
impact on policy or social conditions; unsuccessful legal mobilization
may nevertheless strengthen a policy reform movement by energizing
4
R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] S.C.J. No. 1, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 (abortion); Rocket v. Royal
College of Dental Surgeons of Ontario, [1990] S.C.J. No. 65, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 232 (professional
advertising); Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] S.C.J. No. 94, [1993] 3
S.C.R. 519 (assisted suicide); Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1997] S.C.J. No.
86, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624 (sign language interpretation).
5
Christopher Manfredi, Feminist Activism in the Supreme Court: Legal Mobilization and
the Women’s Legal Education and Action Fund (Vancouver, B.C.: UBC Press 2004), at 181.
6
Richard O. Lempert, “Mobilizing Private Law: An Introductory Essay” (1976) 11 Law
& Soc. Rev. 173.
7
Frances Kahn Zemans, “Legal Mobilization: The Neglected Role of the Law in the Political System” (1983) 77 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 690, at 700.
8
Susan E. Lawrence, The Poor in Court: The Legal Services Program and Supreme
Court Decision Making (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1990), at 40.
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individuals around particular causes; by contrast, successful mobilization may enervate a movement or energize a counter-movement.
Chaoulli and Auton are interesting examples of legal mobilization
for several reasons. First, health care is arguably the single most important area of Canadian public policy: it consumes almost 10 per cent
of GDP and is the largest single expenditure item in provincial budgets.
Second, the cases offer differing visions of the direction health policy
should take: Chaoulli seeks to expand private provision while Auton
seeks to expand public coverage. Finally, one case involves an individual lone crusader (Chaoulli), and the other a group with roots in an organized social movement (Auton). Consequently, both cases provide a
good empirical base for exploring three key questions about legal mobilization: How do cases such as these get into the judicial system? Under
what conditions are such claims likely to be successful? What is the
impact of winning — or losing — on the broader policy environment?
By the end of 2004, of course, only Auton had completed its journey
through the Canadian legal system. After a series of victories in British
Columbia, the province’s “early autism treatment” movement saw its
fortunes dramatically reversed by the Supreme Court. With Chaoulli
still an unfinished story at the time of writing, this paper focuses exclusively on Auton. We begin with a brief overview of the legal mobilization literature and then turn to the case itself.

II. LEGAL MOBILIZATION AND POLICY REFORM
1. Choosing Litigation
The use of litigation as an instrument of socio-political reform traces its roots to the early 20th century, when the National Consumers’
League engaged litigation to advance the interests of working women
and children in the United States.9 However, credit for the systematic
development of this type of litigation usually goes to two groups: the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). Although both organizations oriented legal mobilization around a “leading case”

K. O’Connor & L. Epstein, “Rebalancing the Scales of Justice: Assessment of Public Interest Law” (1984) 7 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 483.
9
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approach,10 the NAACP initially took a more programmatic approach
than did the ACLU. Indeed, the NAACP explicitly developed “a strategic plan for cumulative litigation efforts aimed at achieving specified
social objectives.”11
The NAACP turned to litigation because restrictive election laws
and voting requirements, not to mention poverty and the legacy of slavery, ensured that African-Americans remained a “discrete and insular
minority,”12 unable to defend or advance their interests through normal
democratic political participation. Thus, in 1915 the NAACP entered the
judicial arena to defend the existing legal rights of African Americans,
and in 1939 it established an independent Legal Defense and Education
Fund (LDF) to undertake a systematic program of social reform through
legal mobilization.13 These legal struggles achieved important victories
against restrictive property covenants and segregated education, and in
favour of voting rights. The crowning achievement, of course, was the
U.S. Supreme Court’s unanimous declaration in 1954 that segregated
public education violated the constitutional guarantee of equal protection.14 Indeed, Brown has been credited with making judicial activism
possible,15 and with being “such a moral supernova in civil liberties
adjudication that it almost single handedly justifies the exercise.”16 To
be sure, these victories required further legal and political action to
become even partially effective, but the NAACP’s apparent success
came to define the method and potential of legal mobilization.
By the end of the 1960s, based largely on the NAACP’s experience,
conventional wisdom held that the principal reason for legal mobilization was political disadvantage. According to this theory, litigation occurred when groups were systematically blocked from other avenues of
political change. However, by the middle of the 1970s this conventional
wisdom was under attack. In perhaps the most widely-cited article in the

10
11

Stuart Scheingold, The Myth of Rights (1974), at 173.
Robert L. Rabin, “Perspectives on Public Interest Law” (1976) 28 Stan. L. Rev. 207, at

221.
12

United States v. Caroline Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, at 152-3 (1938).
C. Vose, Caucasians Only: The Supreme Court, the NAACP, and the Restrictive Covenant Cases (1959), at 39, 44.
14
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
15
Cover, “The Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities” (1982) 91
Yale L. J. 1287.
16
Gold, “The Legal Rights Provisions: A New Vision or Déjà Vu?” (1982) 4 S.C.L.R.
107, at 108.
13
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law and society literature, Marc Galanter argued that only repeat player
(RP) litigants, with accumulated legal expertise and extensive legal
resources, were likely to mobilize the law successfully to achieve long
term programmatic objectives.17 Scholars identified other factors, such
as diffuse financial support and longevity, as important in making litigation a feasible strategy.18 It became apparent, in venturing “beyond the
political disadvantage theory,” that groups without political and economic resources were also unlikely to possess the legal resources necessary to sustain systematic litigation campaigns.19 Indeed, even the
NAACP had political resources in the form of financial support from
philanthropic organizations and influential, dedicated and hard-working
individuals with ties to the majority political community.20 These observations suggested that legal mobilization, which appears superficially to
be the exclusive province of political outsiders, actually belongs as
much, and perhaps more, to political insiders.21
2. Winning Cases
Whether seeking to press existing advantages, or mobilizing to
overcome political disadvantage, organized group litigants face several
strategic and tactical choices. The basic strategic choice is between
direct sponsorship of test cases and participation as an intervener (or
amicus curiae, to use American terminology). Direct sponsorship maximizes control of litigation but is expensive; intervener participation is
less costly but provides far less control over the development of legal
rules. From a strategic point of view, legal mobilization will be more
successful to the extent that a social movement exercises centralized
control, brings cases in the proper sequence, and identifies favourable
venues. The principal tactical decision is to identify “winnable” cases
17
Marc Galanter, “Why the ‘Haves’ Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change” (1974) 9 Law & Soc. Rev. 95.
18
Kim L. Scheppele & Jack L. Walker, Mobilizing Interest Groups in America: Patrons,
Professions and Social Movements (Sage Publications, 1991), at 161-68.
19
Susan M. Olson, “Interest Group Litigation in Federal District Courts: Beyond the Political Disadvantage Theory” (1990) 52 J. Pol. 854.
20
Mark V. Tushnet, The NAACP’s Legal Strategy Against Segregated Education, 19251950 (The University of North Carolina Press, 1987), at 2; Richard Kluger, Simple Justice (New
York: Vintage Books, 1975), at 388-90.
21
Ian Brodie, Friends of the Court: The Privileging of Interest Group Litigants in Canada
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002).
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and arguments. The incremental character of judicial policymaking
means that the ultimate legal objectives of a litigation campaign can best
be achieved through the gradual development of discrete rules that eventually form the basis for a new, over-arching, legal doctrine. In practical
terms, this means that cases involving the easiest legal questions must
be identified and litigated first, before moving on to those raising more
problematic issues. Factual clarity and sympathetic plaintiffs are also
important factors in winning individual cases.
3. Policy Impact
The 1960s ideal of legal mobilization as an instrument for improving the position of the politically disadvantaged also began to fade as
scholars questioned whether the achievements of groups like the
NAACP were more apparent than real. As Stuart Scheingold observed
in 1974, “two decades after the Brown decision, [Americans] are still
struggling inconclusively with school desegregation.” According to
Scheingold, the “continued vitality of litigation,” despite the unfulfilled
promise of Brown, could “be read as a triumph of myth over reality.”22
In his view, litigation could produce social reform at best indirectly, by
contributing to a broader process of political mobilization in which
interests are activated, organized and realigned.23 Scheingold’s observations foreshadowed an important debate about legal mobilization between Gerald Rosenberg and Michael McCann, among others, during
the 1990s. This debate opened with Rosenberg’s 1991 book, The Hollow
Hope.24 Rosenberg examined six areas (civil rights, abortion and women’s rights, environment, reapportionment, and criminal law) and posed
this question: Did judicial decisions produce significant social reform?
His findings were pessimistic, and he concluded that systematic institutional factors, including the limited nature of constitutional rights, limited judicial independence, and limited judicial implementation
capacity, made legal mobilization an unreliable path to social reform.25
Despite this pessimism, Rosenberg did recognize some conditions under
which litigation might be effective. First, incentives must exist for key

22
23
24
25

S. Scheingold, supra, note 10, at 95.
Id., at 131.
Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope (The University of Chicago Press, 1991).
Id., at 10.
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actors to implement changes. Second, there must be costs associated
with resisting change. Third, compliance is more likely where the possibility exists that social change can be implemented by parallel institutions. Finally, success will be higher where court orders can be used as
leverage to extract additional resources.26
In 1992 Michael McCann described The Hollow Hope as “bold,
compelling, and important,” yet ultimately unconvincing.27 Although
McCann raised concerns about evidence, interpretation and conceptualization, he argued that Rosenberg’s approach missed the “constitutive
capacity of law” in which “legal knowledge prefigures in part the symbolic terms of material relations and becomes a potential resource in
ongoing struggles to refigure those relations.”28 McCann’s own study of
legal mobilization and the pay equity movement led him to conclude
that legal mobilization provides important political payoffs, even in the
absence of directly positive effects.29 In particular, the mobilization of
rights discourse by marginalized groups, according to McCann, can be a
source of empowerment that facilitates long-term improvement in their
disadvantaged status.30 In response, Rosenberg argued that McCann’s
“de-centered” approach missed important phenomena — such as union
activism — that affected the degree of successful legal mobilization in
the pay equity field.31 According to Rosenberg, a close analysis of
McCann’s findings actually supported the central thesis of The Hollow
Hope that “courts can help progressive forces, but only under conditions
that both occur infrequently and are virtually determinative of change on
their own.”32
One of the most important lessons of the McCann-Rosenberg debate
is that measuring either the success or influence of legal mobilization is
extremely difficult. Success is not a simple concept, nor is it identical to
influence. Success can mean favourable outcomes in individual cases, or
the development of desired legal doctrine. Yet even accomplishing these
two difficult objectives does not guarantee achieving the broader
26

Id., at 33-5.
Michael W. McCann, “Reform Litigation on Trial” (1992) Law & Soc. Inq’y 720.
28
Id., at 733.
29
Michael W. McCann, Rights at Work: Pay Equity Reform and the Politics of Legal Mobilization (1994).
30
Id., at 292.
31
Gerald N. Rosenberg, “Positivism, Interpretivism, and the Study of Law” (1996) 21 Law
& Soc. Inq’y 435, at 448.
32
Id., at 454.
27
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socio-economic and political changes at which legal mobilization aims.
Moreover, case outcomes, doctrinal developments, and broader policy
shifts may be entirely independent of group participation.
As this overview might suggest, one of the principal deficiencies of
the legal mobilization literature is that it is based almost exclusively on
the U.S. experience. American scholars — or at least American political
scientists — have been notoriously indifferent to the comparative study
of law, courts, constitutionalism, and judicial behaviour.33 Although this
indifference has diminished in recent years, it means that the American
understanding of the role of law and courts in policy development and
implementation is less rich than it could be. At the same time, scholars
outside the United States can also be faulted for not paying sufficient
attention to this phenomenon in their own political systems. For example, although scholarly interest in litigation by organized groups in Canada dates back at least 50 years,34 recent studies have focused almost
exclusively on litigation concerning gender equality and sexual orientation.35 Moreover, there have been few systematic attempts to examine
the policy impact of judicial decisions.36 By studying cases like Chaoulli
and Auton, it is thus possible to contribute to the legal mobilization
literature in two separate ways. First, by focusing on a non-American
case, the study leverages the techniques of comparative law to understand better the relationship among litigation, legal rules and social
policy. Second, by locating these case studies within a well-established
33
James L. Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira & Vanessa A. Baird, “On The Legitimacy of National High Courts” (1998) 92 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 343. The Winter 1999 and Spring 2000 issues of
Law and Courts (newsletter of the Law and Courts Section of the American Political Science
Association) also have interesting discussions on the lack of comparative study among U.S. political scientists in this field.
34
J.R. Mallory, Social Credit and the Federal Power in Canada (University of Toronto
Press, 1954).
35
Sherene Razack, Canadian Feminism and the Law: The Women’s Legal Education and
Action Fund and the Pursuit of Equality (Toronto: Second Story Press, 1991); Dr. Ted Morton,
Morgentaler v. Borowski: Abortion, the Charter and the Courts (McCelland & Stewart, 1992);
M. Smith, Lesbian and Gay Rights in Canada: Social Movements and Equality Seeking, 1971-1995
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999); Manfredi, supra, note 5. An important exception is
Troy Riddell, “The Impact of Legal Mobilization and Judicial Decisions: The Case of Official
Minority-Language Education Policy in Canada for Francophones Outside Quebec” (2004) 38 Law
& Soc. Rev. 583.
36
W.A. Bogart, Courts and Country: The Limits of Litigation and the Social and Political
Life of Canada (Toronto, New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1994); W.A. Bogart,
Consequences: The Impact of Law and Its Complexity (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
2002); D. Schneiderman & K. Sutherland, eds., Charting the Consequences: The Impact of Charter
Rights on Canadian Law and Politics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997).
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non-Canadian literature, the study extends knowledge of two vital, yet
under-studied, phenomena in Canadian policy studies.

III. LITIGATING AUTISM TREATMENT REFORM
The Auton case entered the judicial process with a single litigation
objective: to obtain a remedial order of mandamus requiring British
Columbia to fund Lovaas Autism Treatment as a medically necessary
service within its public health care system. In view of this objective, we
adopt as a framework for analysis Phillip Cooper’s model of remedial
decree litigation, which consists of trigger, liability, remedy, and postdecree phases.37 The trigger phase of remedial decree litigation includes
both the general historical practices and specific triggering events that
lead to the initiation of a case. The liability and remedy phases, in which
rights violations are determined and remedies formulated to correct the
violations, constitute the central components of remedial decree litigation. These phases may occur either simultaneously or as the subject of
separate proceedings. The final step in remedial decree litigation is the
post-decree phase, during which remedies are implemented, evaluated
and refined. This phase is characterized by interaction between litigants
and judges, with the degree of judicial involvement related to the extent
of the constitutional violation, the organizational capacity for change,
and the surrounding political culture. With this model providing our
framework, we explore three key questions: How did this issue get into
the legal process? Why did the claim succeed in lower courts? Why did
it fail so dramatically in the Supreme Court?
1. Triggering Litigation
In 1987, Dr. O. Ivar Lovass published the results of a study measuring the effects of a particular form of “early intensive behavioral intervention” (EIBI) for the treatment of autism.38 The study reported that 17
of 19 children who received an average of 40 hours per week of intensive
individual therapeutic treatment demonstrated significant improvements
37
Phillip J. Cooper, Hard Judicial Choices: Federal District Court Judges and State and
Local Officials (Oxford University Press, 1988), at 16-24.
38
O. Ivar Lovaas, “Behavioral Treatment and Normal Educational and Intellectual Functioning in Young Autistic Children” (1987) 55 J. Clin. Cons. Psych. 3.
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in their social and communication skills. Moreover, nine of the children
successfully completed first grade in regular classes and were no different from their peers with respect to IQ, adaptive skills, and emotional
functioning. Six years later, Lovaas and two colleagues conducted a
follow-up study, which suggested that the earlier treatment gains had
been maintained and that eight of nine children were continuing to progress in regular classes without special support.39
Because of the treatment’s apparent success, intensity (40 hours per
week over two to three years), and cost (approximately $50,000 annually), the Lovaas studies triggered the establishment of a continent-wide
movement to secure private and public funding for EIBI that became
known as Families for Early (or, in some cases, “Effective”) Autism
Treatment (FEAT). Established in 1993 in northern California, the
FEAT movement quickly spread across the United States and Canada.
After engaging in individual advocacy for government funding of LAT
for a year, Dr. Sabrina Freeman, a sociologist with an autistic daughter,
founded a branch of FEAT in British Columbia in 1996 and became its
executive director. Starting from the proposition that Lovaas Autism
Treatment (LAT) “is an effective, scientifically supported treatment for
young children with the neurological disorder of autism,” FEAT BC’s
position from the outset was that the B.C. government’s refusal to recognize LAT as a medically necessary service provided through the province’s health care system contravened “several laws designed to protect
the rights of the disabled.”
Litigation was thus at the forefront of FEAT BC’s campaign to
change the government’s policy toward LAT. Asserting that the “government of B.C. must recognize its legal obligation and financially support early, intensive and scientifically proven autism treatment for every
child diagnosed with this condition,” it explicitly invited lawyers “who
want to change the discriminatory health care system in Canada” to
contact the organization. Referring to litigation in the United States,
FEAT BC stressed that “the force of law must also be brought to bear in
Canada.”40 Most relevantly, in August of 1996 a decision by the Alberta
Court of Queen’s Bench held that “Lovaas-type programs” constituted a
service for handicapped children within the meaning of the province’s
39
J.J. McEachen, T. Smith & O.I. Lovaas, “Long-term Outcome for Children with Autism
Who Received Early Intensive Behavioral Treatment” (1993) 97 Am. J. Ment. Ret. 359.
40
Online at: <http://www.featbc.org/legal_issues/> (last accessed 30 June 2005).
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Child Welfare Act and ordered the director of child welfare services to
fund 90 per cent of the therapy’s cost.41
FEAT BC secured strong legal representation from Christopher
Hinkson, a partner in the Vancouver law firm of Harper, Grey, Easton.
Founded in 1907, Harper, Grey, Easton is a relatively small (approximately 50 lawyers) firm specializing in civil litigation. Designated as
one of the leading 500 lawyers in Canada by Lexpert, Hinkson’s practice includes medical malpractice, personal injury litigation, professional negligence, insurance, products liability and administrative law. From
1987 to 1995 he served as Vice Chairman/Director of the B.C. Medical
Services Foundation. He is, in short, a highly experienced litigator with
particular expertise in medical and health care issues, backed by a distinguished firm.
On March 30, 1998 FEAT BC issued a press release entitled “Malpractice in the B.C. Government,” which criticized the government for
refusing to fund the “one effective treatment” for autism. On July 30,
1998 a number of families received a joint letter from the deputy ministers of Education and Children and Families, informing them that the
government was not “in a resource position” to fund LAT.42 Two weeks
later, Connor Auton and his mother Michelle started class action proceedings on behalf of all children and their families who had been denied funding for LAT by the provincial government. Although the
courts refused to certify the proceedings as a class action, the pleadings
were amended to include three additional children and their parents,
including Sabrina Freeman and her daughter Michelle Tamir. The petitioners sought a declaration from the court that the denial of funding for
LAT contravened their constitutional rights under sections 7 and 15(1)
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,43 and also sought an
order of mandamus requiring that the government compensate them for
the costs of LAT already incurred and for the future costs of treatment.
41

C.R. v. Alberta (Director of Child Welfare), [1996] A.J. No. 760, 43 Alta. L.R. (3d) 179

(Q.B.).
42
Auton (Guardian ad litem of) v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2000] B.C.J. No.
1547, 78 B.C.L.R (3d) 55, at para. 6 (S.C.). [hereinafter “Auton No. 1”].
43
Section 7 declares that: “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person
and the right not to be deprived thereof except according to the principles of fundamental justice.”
Section 15(1) declares that: “Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to
the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without
discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or
physical disability.”
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Both parties agreed, however, that the liability and remedy issues could
be dealt with in separate proceedings.
2. Liability Proceedings
The liability phase of proceedings consisted of a 10-day trial before
Marion Allan J. of the B.C. Supreme Court in April, 2000. The principal
point of factual disagreement between the parties concerned the clinical
effectiveness of LAT, which was the key issue underlying the legal
claim that it should be considered “medically necessary.” The petitioners built their case in favour of LAT in two stages. Since all four children had received LAT at their parents’ expense, the first stage was to
demonstrate that the treatment had made a difference in these specific
cases. Although the government challenged the admissibility of physicians’ letters as evidence of progress under LAT, it did not dispute the
parents’ own affidavits concerning improvements in behaviour and
communication skills. Consequently, Allan J. declared that she was
“satisfied on the basis of admissible evidence that the infant petitioners
made significant gains as a result of the Lovaas Autism Treatment they
received.”44 The petitioners’ claims, of course, went further than this.
They contended that their children’s experience simply affirmed the
results of the 1987 and 1993 studies, indicating that LAT “is a medically
necessary service insofar as it significantly improves the condition of
these children.”45
While not vigorously disputing the claim of positive outcomes in
these specific cases, the government did question the general scientific
validity of the two Lovaas studies. The government argued that two
methodological flaws seriously undermined the Lovaas studies: the
absence of random assignment into experimental and control groups and
the failure to replicate the study.46 In the government’s view, these flaws
made it impossible to derive any general conclusions about the effectiveness of LAT from these studies. At best, it argued, the treatment
could be considered experimental. In support of this position, the government commissioned a study by the Office of Health Technology

44

Auton No. 1, supra, note 42, at para.18.
Id., at para. 29.
According to one of the authors of the 1993 study, there have been no other controlled
studies of EIBI programs for autistic children (Auton No. 1, supra, note 42, at para. 27).
45
46
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Assessment Services and Policy Research at the University of British
Columbia. The study concluded that, “while many forms of intensive
behavioural therapy clearly benefit children with autism, there is insufficient, scientifically-valid effectiveness evidence to establish a causal
relationship between a particular program of intensive, behavioural
treatment, and the achievement of ‘normal functioning’.” The study
based this conclusion on two findings: (1) the existence of only one
published report of a controlled clinical trial the results of which the
scientific community was reluctant to accept; and (2) lack of corroboration by independent researchers. The report advised that “randomized
trials of alternative early intensive treatment programs are ethical and
feasible,” and that such research “is required before effectiveness claims
can form the basis of public funding decisions regarding alternative
program options.”47
Justice Allan was, to say the least, unimpressed by the report.48 She
suggested that its authors had misled the court about whether the report
had been subjected to external peer review before being filed as an exhibit in the proceedings; she criticized the research team for not consulting health professionals supportive of LAT and for relying on a “single
anecdotal comment” for a key finding; and she criticized the report for
falsely asserting that Dr. Lovaas and his colleagues had claimed that
LAT “cures” autism. In her view, the report added “little or nothing” to
existing debates about the 1987 and 1993 studies and exhibited such “an
obvious bias” towards the government’s position as to detract “significantly from its usefulness.” The only part of the report that she found
valuable was its acknowledgment that “early intervention with behavioural treatment can help to alleviate autistic symptoms in many if not
most autistic children.” Indeed, the expert witness testimony for both
parties led her to conclude that there “are no effective competing treatments” for “those based on principles of ABA.”49 Moreover, she determined that “early intensive behavioural treatment” should be considered
a “medically necessary service” under the terms of both provincial and
federal legislation.50 She reached this conclusion by broadly defining a
47
K. Bassett, C. Green & A. Kazanjian, “Autism and Lovaas Treatment: A Systematic
Review of Effectiveness Evidence” British Columbia Office of Health Technology Assessment
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“medically necessary” service as “whatever cures or ameliorates illness.”51
Having made this determination, and finding that British Columbia
was not providing such treatment, Allan J. turned her attention to
whether this failure violated constitutionally guaranteed equality rights.
Two prior Supreme Court of Canada decisions set the parameters of her
discussion. First, in 1997 the Court had held in Eldridge v. British Columbia that British Columbia’s failure to provide a comprehensive system of publicly funded sign language interpretation for deaf patients
denied those patients equal benefit of the law by limiting their ability to
communicate effectively with health care practitioners.52 Second, in
1999 the Court had consolidated 10 years of jurisprudence to set controlling principles for the application of equality rights.53 According to
Law v. Canada, the purpose of section 15(1) is “to prevent the violation
of essential human dignity and freedom through the imposition of disadvantage, stereotyping, or political or social prejudice, and to promote
a society in which all persons enjoy equal recognition at law as human
beings or as members of Canadian society, equally capable and equally
deserving of concern, respect and consideration.”54
From Eldridge, Allan J. determined that, “having created a universal
medicare system of health benefits, the government is prohibited from
conferring those benefits in a discriminatory manner.” From Law, she
concluded that, by “failing to make appropriate accommodation for their
health care needs” on the premise “that one cannot effectively treat
autistic children,” the government was discriminating against such children by perpetuating a “misconceived stereotype.”55 She rejected the
government’s claim that its decision was justified by — in fact, based
on — a rational allocation of finite health care resources. Nevertheless,
although she concluded that “the appropriate treatment is ABA or early
intensive behavioural intervention” and that British Columbia “discriminates against the petitioners contrary to s. 15(1) by failing to accommodate their disadvantaged position by providing effective treatment for
51
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autism,”56 Allan J. agreed with the province that she did not have jurisdiction to make a specific order requiring the province to provide LAT.
Instead, she invited counsel for both parties to make additional submissions on the precise nature of an appropriate remedy for the constitutional violation.
Although favourable to FEAT BC, the trial court’s liability finding
was not without difficulty. First, the court arguably focused on the
wrong principle of the Canada Health Act when it defined the issue in
terms of universality.57 This principle is usually understood as requiring
that all qualified provincial residents must receive insured services, not
that all possible medical treatments be insured. Debates about the appropriate scope of insured services instead fall under the principle of
comprehensiveness. Second, in broadening the definition of “medically
necessary” the court departed from the Canada Health Act’s definition
as encompassing services delivered in hospitals or by physicians.58
Moreover, the court may have misinterpreted expert testimony in order
to reach this broad definition. According to Allan J., the expert (Dr.
Morris Barer) defined “medical treatment” as “whatever cures or ameliorates illness.”59 It is unclear, however, whether Dr. Barer considered
“medical treatment” and “medically necessary service” as interchangeable terms.
3. Remedy Phase
The remedy proceedings took place in November 2000, and Allan J.
rendered her judgment in February 2001.60 Part of these proceedings
concerned the province’s initial efforts to comply with the liability ruling. Specifically, it had established the Provincial Centre for Autism and
Related Disorders (P-CARD) to provide province-wide services, including EIBI, for at least 20 hours per week to all diagnosed autistic children
less than six years of age by 2003. The petitioners objected to this program because of its age restrictions, limited number of treatment hours,
56
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and failure to include LAT. Justice Allan approached these objections
cautiously, noting that the case “raises significant public policy issues as
to the respective roles of the judiciary and the legislature.” “The issues
raised by the petitioners,” she continued, “underscore the difficulties
inherent in a process where the Court’s finding of unconstitutionality is
designed to change governmental behaviour.” Recognizing the importance of judicial review, Allan J. nevertheless held that “the judiciary
cannot dictate what treatment programmes should or should not be implemented, nor can it dictate how limited financial resources should be
allocated.” She was unwilling to characterize the government’s compliance efforts as reluctant, negative or intransigent.61 In her view, it was
too early to judge the efficacy of the P-CARD program, and therefore
premature “to make an order of mandamus.”62 The result was a threepart remedy declaring a denial of equality rights, directing the Crown to
fund early intensive behavioural therapy for children with autism, and
awarding the adult petitioners in the case $20,000 in monetary damages.
4. Postdecree Phase
From Allan J.’s courtroom, the case moved to the British Columbia
Court of Appeal, where the government appealed the liability declaration and the petitioners cross-appealed on the treatment and damages
issues.63 The appellate court unanimously rejected the government’s
appeal, holding that “the failure of the health care administrators of the
Province to consider the individual needs of the infant complainants by
funding treatment is a statement that their mental disability is less worthy of assistance than the transitory medical problems of others” and
signaled that “the community was less interested in their plight than the
plight of other children needing medical care and adults needing mental
health therapy.”64 The court also rejected the petitioners’ cross-appeal
against Allan J.’s decision not to require funding for LAT specifically,
agreeing with her conclusion that it was not the only effective form of
EIBI that autistic children could receive.65 It similarly rejected their
61
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cross-appeal against her refusal to require treatment beyond the age of
six. Although accepting “that the efficacy of treatment is unlikely to end
at the crisp attainment of school age,” the appellate court held that “issues of funding programs for children of school age may involve additional considerations not before the Court, either in evidence or
submissions.”66 However, the court did direct that disputes about the
duration of treatment be decided on a case-by-case basis in an appropriate dispute resolution process or in trial court proceedings, thus in principle expanding Allan J.’s remedy to include children over the age of
six. The cross-appeal was successful with respect to the specific children involved in the original proceedings. Although the court was unwilling to impose a general policy on LAT or duration of treatment, it
found that the children named in the original complaint were “entitled to
government funded treatment in the nature of that which they have been
receiving…to continue until the medical view is that no further significant benefit in alleviating the autistic condition can reasonably be expected from a continuation of the treatment.”67
The province reacted to its appellate court loss in two ways. Most
obviously, it applied for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, which the
Court granted on May 15, 2003. Less obviously, it sought to restrict the
appellate court’s ruling to the four children named as parties. Not surprisingly, 23 families who had been part of the original class action
application, and who had remained background participants in the Auton
litigation, objected to the province’s action. They filed a petition in the
British Columbia Supreme Court claiming the same remedy as the
named Auton litigants, including monetary damages.68 With the exception of monetary damages, the court agreed with these families and held
that they, too, should receive government funded LAT until such time as
it was no longer medically beneficial.
On June 9, 2004, the Supreme Court of Canada heard oral arguments in Auton. The case’s broad importance was evident in the fact that
it attracted 19 interveners, including 10 governments (Canada, New
Brunswick, Manitoba, Quebec, Ontario, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Newfoundland and Labrador, Prince Edward Island, and Nova Scotia), eight
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organizations (Canadian Association for Community Living, Council of
Canadians With Disabilities, Women’s Legal Education and Action
Fund, DisAbled Women’s Network, Autism Society Canada, Families
for Effective Autism Treatment of Alberta Foundation, Friends of Children with Autism, Families for Early Autism Treatment of Ontario), and
one individual. Not surprisingly, the governments were all concerned
about the case’s implications for their capacity to set health care funding
priorities. By contrast, the non-governmental organization interveners
all urged the Court to uphold the lower court judgments. Interestingly,
the individual intervener — Michelle Dawson, an adult autistic woman
— urged the Court to reverse the earlier judgments on the grounds that
those decisions, rather than the province’s refusal to fund LAT, perpetuated a stereotype that autistic individuals are incapable of living fulfilling lives and are doomed to institutionalization.
The submissions on behalf of the Auton group sought to preserve
the equality rights liability ruling and to expand the province’s liability
to encompass section 7 of the Charter. The factum thus argued that
British Columbia was liable for the entire cost of providing LAT to the
children named in the lower court proceedings. Consequently, the families asked the Court to order reimbursement of their LAT expenses from
the date they were first incurred instead of from the date of the initial
declaration of a Charter violation. For the families, therefore, the Supreme Court proceedings were less about public policy than about compensation for expenses incurred in securing therapy for their children
which had been unconstitutionally denied them by the provincial government. This was apparent in oral argument, where Christopher
Hinkson tried to focus the justices’ attention on a specific instance of
intransigent behaviour by government officials rather than on the broader implications of the litigation. Hinkson denied that he was asking the
Court to substitute its health policy preferences for those of the province. All the families were demanding, he argued, was that bureaucratic
funding decisions be transparent and non-arbitrary. For British Columbia, by contrast, the issues before the Court were very much about public policy. Indeed, British Columbia argued that the lower court
judgments would “distort the process” of health care funding decisions
by creating “a category of constitutionally mandated medical services.”69
69

Factum of the Government of British Columbia, Attorney-General of British Columbia
v. Auton (2004), at para. 5.

(2005), 29 S.C.L.R. (2d)

Reversal of Fortune

129

In oral argument the province submitted that decisions about refusing,
delaying, or rationing services were polycentric decisions within the
general discretion of government.
The Court delivered its judgment in Auton on November 19, 2004.70
The unanimous decision, delivered by the Chief Justice, was a stunning
legal defeat for FEAT BC. The Court reversed both lower court decisions, dismissed the petitioners’ cross-appeal, and held unconditionally
that British Columbia’s refusal to fund LAT did not constitute discrimination under section 15. Although expressing sympathy for the petitioners and the lower court decisions in their favour, McLachlin C.J. was
clear that the issue before the Court was not “what the public health
system should provide,” but whether “failure to fund” certain services
under that system can be “an unequal and discriminatory denial of benefits.”71 She drew a clear distinction, in other words, between decisions
about what is included in the health care “basket” (“a matter for Parliament and the legislature”) and the delivery of services authorized by law
(to be done “in a non-discriminatory manner”).
Four considerations — two factual and two legal — drove the Chief
Justice’s judgment. One factual consideration, referred to by the Chief
Justice at three points in her judgment, was the “controversial” or
“emergent” nature of the autism treatment under consideration.72 Indeed,
she referred explicitly to Michelle Dawson’s intervention against the
therapy, and cited specific objections to it such as “its reliance in its
early years on crude and arguably painful stimuli” and “its goal of
changing the child’s mind and personality.”73 The second factual consideration was the existence of some government funded programs for
autistic children and their families.74 “At the time of trial,” she noted,
“the government funded a number of programs for young autistic children, and appeared to be moving toward funding some form of early
intervention therapy.”75 Although the Chief Justice suggested that, in
retrospect, the government should have moved more quickly, she concluded that “it is difficult to say that the government in purpose or effect
70
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put autistic children and their families ‘on the back burner’.”76 By focusing on these facts — rather than on the tragic impact of autism, bureaucratic intransigence, personal economic sacrifice, or individual progress
under LAT — the Chief Justice provided a relatively benign picture of
the pre-Auton policy status quo.
However, it was in her legal analysis of the claim that the Chief Justice dealt her harshest blow to the claimants. In her view, their claim
simply did not involve a benefit provided by law; moreover, even if it
did, there was no discrimination in the decision not to fund LAT. On the
first point, the Chief Justice concluded that nothing in the legislative
framework of public health care “provides anyone with all medically
required treatment.”77 In her view, the legal benefit conferred by this
framework was restricted to “core” medical services, which did not
include EIBI therapy under either federal or provincial law. Although
provinces have discretion to extend public funding to “non-core” services, she continued, there is no constitutional obligation to do so either
generally or for specific services. A government, she stressed, is “under
no obligation to create a particular benefit,” but is “free to target the
social programs it wishes to fund as a matter of public policy, provided
the benefit itself is not conferred in a discriminatory manner.”78 From
this perspective, EIBI autism therapy was simply outside the range of
health services to which the claimants had a legal right — whether by
statute or Constitution. There could not, therefore, be any violation of
section 15(1) in a decision not to fund LAT.
Although the Chief Justice could have ended her inquiry there, she
nevertheless considered whether there was any basis to the claim of
discrimination in this case. On this point, she defined the comparator
group in such narrow terms as to make a finding of discrimination virtually impossible. She rejected the suggestion that autistic children should
be compared to non-disabled children or to adults with a mental illness.79 Instead, she argued that the “appropriate comparator” is “a nondisabled person or a person suffering a disability other than a mental
disability (here autism) seeking or receiving funding for a non-core
therapy important for his or her present and future health, which is
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emergent and only recently becoming recognized as medically required.”80 The lower courts had erred, in other words, in comparing the
claim for an “emergent” non-core therapy to funding for established
therapies.81 Discrimination could only exist, she concluded, if the province had acted more quickly in funding equally emergent non-core therapies for non-disabled or physically (rather than mentally) disabled
persons. Not only was there no evidence of such action, according to the
Chief Justice, but the government’s conduct, “considered in the context
of the emergent nature of ABA/IBI therapy…raises doubts about
whether there was a real denial or differential treatment of autistic children.”82
Despite her vindication of British Columbia’s position, the Chief
Justice did not let its actions escape criticism altogether. She described
the decision to transfer jurisdiction over child and youth mental health
from the Ministry of Health to the Ministry of Children and Families as
“inauspicious.”83 She also concurred with the trial court’s finding that
the government’s actions “did not meet the ‘gold standard of scientific
methodology’.”84 Nevertheless, she concluded that “there is no evidence
suggesting that the government’s approach to ABA/IBI therapy was
different than its approach to other comparable, novel therapies for nondisabled persons or persons with a different type of disability.”85 Whatever the weaknesses of the government’s decision making process, they
were not constitutional deficiencies.
5. Analysis
The emergence of a rights-based argument for public funding of
Lovaas Autism Treatment in British Columbia was planned and strategic rather than accidental. FEAT BC was connected to an organizational
network dedicated to ensuring accessibility to LAT through legal action.
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Its website referred readers to more than 20 U.S. and Canadian judgments — based primarily on statutes and administrative law — imposing obligations on public authorities to fund LAT. It proactively sought
legal counsel to pursue its claim in court, and secured the participation
of a highly qualified lawyer with specialized expertise in health-related
litigation. FEAT BC’s contribution to the movement was to raise the
stakes beyond other Canadian autism litigation by framing its argument
as a Charter claim. In this sense, Auton was not simply about getting
access to a service, but about entrenching that service in such a way as
to immunize it from shifting policy preferences or scientific evidence.
Among the factors accounting for the case’s initial success were sympathetic plaintiffs (autistic children and their struggling parents), good
facts (evidence of family sacrifice and individual progress under the
therapy), and a favourable venue (B.C. courts had established a track
record of intervening in health care policy). These factors came together
to link a broad definition of “medically necessary treatment” to fundamental statutory (universality) and constitutional (equality) principles.
Why were these factors ineffective in the Supreme Court of Canada? One answer, as discussed above, lies in the Chief Justice’s alternative factual framing. She chose to emphasize the controversial and
emergent nature of LAT, as well as the province’s good faith (even if
imperfect) efforts to provide EIBI to progressively larger numbers of
autistic children. A second answer lies in her understanding of Eldridge,
which differed from the trial court’s understanding. According to the
Chief Justice, Eldridge “did not assist the petitioners” because it concerned unequal access to a benefit already provided by law while their
claim was for “access to a benefit that the law has not conferred.”86
Finally, although not cited in her judgment, the relevance of the Court’s
2002 decision in Gosselin v. Quebec should not be underestimated.87 In
Gosselin a majority of the Court, led by the Chief Justice, held that a
differential welfare regime for young adults (under 30) did not violate
the Charter’s equality rights. As the Chief Justice noted then, the issues
raised by that case had “implications for the range of options available
to governments throughout Canada in targeting welfare programs to
address the particular needs and circumstances of individuals requiring
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social assistance.”88 Her judgment, easily transferable to other social
programs, was that this range of options should not be unduly narrowed.
Although narrowly decided, Gosselin was a good indicator of the Chief
Justice’s thinking on the issue.
The Auton case offers an important glimpse into both the promise
and limitations of legal mobilization. Its ultimate resolution in the Supreme Court suggests the most obvious limitation: legal mobilization
can fail to establish the desired legal rule. Certainly, the Court’s unanimous rejection of the lower court rulings in Auton was an unambiguous
reversal of legal fortunes for the LAT movement. Yet, even when the
case was legally successful, it provided FEAT BC with mixed results.
On the positive side, two courts recognized a constitutional right to
government-funded EIBI treatment for autism, awarded monetary damages to four families, and granted compensation for incurred expenses
and future autism treatment of their choice to 27 families. The decisions
also led British Columbia to convert a small pilot program of treatment
into full-fledged government policy, even as it appealed its legal losses.
Finally, the victories supported legal mobilization outside B.C. as FEAT
branches in other provinces, notably Ontario, began leveraging the B.C.
judgments to press for extended EIBI funding. Indeed, 11 autism funding cases were decided in various provinces in 2003 and 2004.89 On the
negative side, FEAT BC never achieved its objective of obtaining a
legal declaration that LAT is the only effective treatment for autism.
Consistent with Rosenberg’s observations, the B.C. courts were reluctant to exercise their full remedial authority in a social policy field outside their traditional area of expertise in legal procedure. The legal
victories never provided the LAT movement with its ultimate goal.
Nor, however, did the Supreme Court defeat, as disappointing
and deflating as it must have been, remove all of the energy from the
movement. Governments still face significant, and potentially successful,
88
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autism litigation. According to the Autism Society of Canada, there
were more than 180 other cases, involving over 1,600 families, still
pending in November, 2004.90 Moreover, in January, 2005 the Ontario
Superior Court granted an interlocutory injunction against the province,
requiring it to continue funding EIBI treatment for two six-year-old
boys despite the Auton ruling.91 The court distinguished the two cases on
the grounds that Ontario provided funding through its Ministry of
Community and Social Services rather than through the Ontario Hospital Insurance Plan. As such, the boys were being denied a benefit provided by law on the basis of age. Finding that the boys would suffer
“irreparable harm” if withdrawn from treatment, the court held that it
would be discriminatory to do so. In this sense, Auton may have simply
shifted the focus of legal mobilization efforts from one constitutional
arena to another.
Equally, and perhaps more importantly, the legal defeat may have
favourably mobilized public opinion. Editorial reaction to the decision
was generally to the effect that governments should fund the treatment
whether constitutionally required to or not.92 Even the National Post —
an outlet not generally known for its support of government spending,
publicly-funded health care, or judicial activism — criticized provincial
governments for not funding LAT and for undertaking costly court
battles to avoid any obligation to do so.93 An Ipsos-Reid poll reported in
December, 2004 that 84 per cent of Canadians supported public funding
for EIBI despite the Court’s decision,94 and two MPs (Scott Reid (Con)
and Tony Martin (NDP)) tabled petitions in Parliament supporting funding for EIBI. As McCann might argue, the six-year litigation campaign
for autism funding brought the issue to public attention and shifted the
policy advantage toward the movement behind it.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Auton story, at least as briefly rendered here, is in many ways
consistent with both sides of the debate concerning legal mobilization.
Although litigation ultimately failed to establish the sought-for legal
rule, it nevertheless nudged public policy in the desired direction and
strengthened the autism treatment reform movement by energizing its
participants and raising public visibility. Consistent with McCann’s
position, the litigation effort succeeded in using legal arguments to reconstitute the policy debate about effective autism treatment. Moreover,
the nature of the claimants meant that the effort did not generate a countermovement similar to what scholars have found in the case of abortion
and gay rights litigation.95 Nevertheless, Auton is also consistent with
aspects of Rosenberg’s argument. Although there was no organized
countermovement, the lower court successes generated an article by two
highly respected scholars — Donna Greschner and Stephen Lewis —
that was highly critical of those lower court decisions. In addition, those
successes opened the door to Michelle Dawson’s intervention, which
raised doubts about the universal acceptance of LAT as an appropriate
treatment for autism. Institutionally, limited judicial independence and
implementation capacity manifested itself in the form of remedial caution in the British Columbia courts, which meant that even legal victories did not translate directly into optimal policy change. Finally, the
decision to invest six years and significant resources in a litigation campaign obviously entailed opportunity costs, the magnitude of which is
difficult to measure.
What are the broader implications of litigating health care reform?
In the specific case of autism treatment, the combination of Auton and
the Ontario decisions suggest a number of possible consequences, none
of which are intended or desirable. First, given that there is no constitutional obligation to fund ABA or EIBI, but that there may be a constitutional obligation to fund treatment indefinitely once programs are in
place, current autism litigation may have a chilling effect on provincial
innovation. Second, the current state of the law in Ontario may provide an
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incentive for parents whose children have any kind of learning difficulty
to encourage autism diagnoses in order to access these programs. Finally, as increased demand meets the reality of finite resources — in the
form of money and qualified therapists — treatment waiting lists will
lengthen. In each of these scenarios, the provincial response will undoubtedly generate even more litigation.
More generally, both Chaoulli and Auton are products of frustration
with the inability of apparently unresponsive health care decision makers to provide a desired level of service. Although the desire of Canadians, frustrated by perceived bureaucratic and legislative inaction, to seek
health care solutions from the courts is understandable, the benefits and
costs of this path to policy change merit closer attention. The obvious
benefit is that, when litigation is successful, courts may be able to order
governments to act quickly and forcefully. Yet litigation is not without
disadvantages. First, the articulation of policy demands in the form of
constitutional rights can exclude alternative policy choices from consideration. Rights-based litigation aims at altering policy priorities in an
especially powerful way because of the difficulty of reversing, or even
modifying, the priorities set through it. In this sense, health care litigation may, in some circumstances, be understood as a sophisticated form
of queue jumping because it posits that a particular health care need
deserves a higher priority than it has because of its grounding in a constitutional right. Second, the adversarial nature of litigation is best suited
to resolving concrete disputes between two parties by imposing retrospective remedies. Complex policy issues — like health care — involve
multiple stakeholders, constantly changing facts and evidence, and predictive assessments about the future impact of decisions. Finally, rightsbased litigation, particularly at the Supreme Court level, by definition
imposes national solutions on inherently local problems. These solutions
can ignore differences among provinces and suppress the provincial
experimentation necessary to find innovative approaches to policy problems. Canadian health care faces a multitude of complex challenges,
which requires careful consideration of the contribution that courts can
make in meeting those challenges before embracing litigation as an
instrument of reform in health care policy.

